Tim Hunter sent me this interesting
paper by sociologist Kieran Healy that argues against nuance as a theoretical virtue. The title, “Fuck
Nuance” tersely provides the paper’s main conclusion. It is a paper that linguists
might find interesting for, IMO, many of the vices that nuance has wrt
sociological theory carry over pretty directly to theory within linguistics.
Indeed, as Healy argues, nuance is often the scourge of theory. Healy describes
it as follows:
It is the act
of making—or the call to make—some bit of theory “richer” or “more
sophisticated”
by adding complexity to it, usually by way of some additional dimension, level,
or aspect, but in the absence of any strong means of disciplining or specifying
the relationship between the new elements and the existing ones. Theorists do this to themselves and
demand it of others. It is typically a holding maneuver. It is what you do when
faced with a question that you do not yet have a compelling or interesting
answer to. Thinking up compelling or interesting ideas is quite difficult, and
so often it is easier to embrace complexity than cut through it. (2)
In other words,
nuance is the name for the impulse to do anything and everything to cover that
last data point. It is “the free-floating request that something more be added”
and this sort of request, if indulged, becomes “a pernicious and invasive weed”
that strangles the hope of explanation. As Healy writes:
…the kudzu of
nuance … makes us shy away from the riskier aspects of
abstraction and
theory-building generally, especially if it is the first and most frequent response
we hear. Instead of pushing some abstraction or argument along for a while to
see where it goes, there is a tendency to start hedging theory with
particulars. People complain that you’re leaving some level or dimension out,
and tell you to bring it back in. Crucially, “accounting for”, “addressing”, or
“dealing” with the missing item is an unconstrained process. That is, the
question is not how a theory can handle this or that issue internally, but
rather the suggestion to expand it with this new term or terms. (5)
I am very sympathetic to Healy’s observations. Indeed, I
think that I am on record lamenting this tendency within current linguistic
theory (see here).
Rare is the paper or interaction where theoretical profligacy is resisted and a
data point or two left stranded in the deductive wilderness. Indeed, tolerance
for “counter-examples”[1]
is taken to be sure evidence of scientific felony, and to forestall such a
charge we lard our papers and stories with ad hocry that serves to both obscure
the interesting explanatory points being made and to confuse us into mistaking
description for explanation. One of the virtues of the early Minimalist papers
was to warn against this tendency, alas to little apparent effect. What makes
this truly unfortunate is that these demands, as Healy notes, have baleful
results.
The result is a lot of
unproductive blocking. Both specific explanations and more
abstract
concepts and theories suffer. By calling for a theory to be more comprehensive,
or for an explanation to include additional dimensions, or a concept to become
more flexible and multi-faceted, we paradoxically end up with less clarity. We
lose information by adding detail. A further odd consequence is that the
apparent scope of theories increases even as the range of their
actually-accomplished application in explanations narrows. (6)
The paper makes
other interesting points and I encourage you to read it. And please don’t think
that this is just dumb sociologists and that his observations do not apply to
linguistics. Here’s one more observation that I believe hits the mark
concerning the motivations behind looking for nuance:
There is a strong tendency
to embrace the fine-grain, both as a means of
defense against
criticism and as a moral guarantor of the value of everyone’s empirical research
project. (4)
So, I am with Healy
here. Fuck theoretical nuance!
[1]
These are scare quotes. I am currently hard riding a hobby horse by the name of
“most people don’t really understand what a serious counter-example is.” Maybe
I will write on this sometime soon, but right now I am loving the verbal ride.
Couldn't agree more.
ReplyDeleteAgreed!
ReplyDeleteI was recently complaining to a semanticist friend that semantics articles are far too long (often >50 pgs). He responded that of course this is the case because semantics is so nuanced. This post kind of allows me to link the article length complaint with another issue I always have with the semantics literature which is that one can't evaluate how a given analysis fits with the theory, because the theory is just so nuanced.
Side-note: I think the scare-quotes around "counter-example" might be catching on. I recently got reviews for an abstract that used the scare-quoted variant of "counter-examples". I must say I was absolutely befuddled by it until now. now I'm only slightly befuddled.
I like that paper. Could this help us understand why some usage-based or functionalist theorists don't worry all too deeply about accounting for, say a handful of contrived sentences purportedly showing parasitic gaps — "a data point or two left stranded"?
ReplyDeleteMaybe. The issue is always going to be what constitutes "contrived." But this is exactly where we ought to be focusing our attentions.
Delete