tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post3353549065104494090..comments2024-03-28T04:04:55.806-07:00Comments on Faculty of Language: Why, How and When We Need CowbellNorberthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15701059232144474269noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-63526809659387336772013-07-09T06:58:06.310-07:002013-07-09T06:58:06.310-07:00I have posted something to address your first poin...I have posted something to address your first point concerning what replaces falsificationism. As to your second question, there are several in the history of linguistics, I believe. The one relevant to my own current concerns involve how to weigh the virtues of unification of the GB modules. My own interest in the last decade has been to try and unify all the module specific principles in GB in terms of Merge. This, to speak informally, requires reducing all non-local dependencies to movement. Now doing this creates reams of empirical problems, as I found out in practice when I tried to reduce control to movement. However, I believed, and still do, that the virtues of this kind of unification are great when seen in the context of DP. So great that I have been willing to downplay apparent empirical problems, at least for a while. So, here is a concrete example, no doubt tinged with special pleading.<br /><br />There are other similar cases: the replacement of constructions with 'Move alpha' style rules led to a lot of empirical slack. This was slowly replaced by figuring out how to pack descriptive details that were lost into heads as features (Criteria in Rizzi's sense). Some construction grammarians have argued that this is not possible in general. However, it was evident that were we to go to a simpler transformational account and eliminate constructions as theoretical primitives that the observational s**t would hit the empirical fan. Still, it was a good idea even if it took 10 years to show it would work. And the work continues: think cartography.<br /><br />Hope these examples help.Norberthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15701059232144474269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-65823062169866976772013-07-09T02:30:42.829-07:002013-07-09T02:30:42.829-07:00"First, falsificationism tacitly assumes that..."First, falsificationism tacitly assumes that the primary defect a proposal/story/theory can have is failure to cover the data. In other words, in tacitly presents the view that the primary virtue a theory has is data coverage. In sophisticated versions, other benchmarks are recognized, however, even non-naïve versions of falsificationism, in virtue of being falsificationist, place primary stress on getting the data points well organized."<br /><br />Falsificationism is primarily concerned with whether the theory is true or false. It is nothing to do with organizing data points whatever that might be. <br /><br />Even false theories -- homeopathy, Ptolemaic astronomy, psychoanalysis etc -- predict lots of things correctly so confirmation just doesn't work as a philosophy of science. <br />You need some way of getting rid of false theories; what takes the place of falsificationism in your theory?<br /><br />I agree that EO (good term!) is crucial. If you have a theory A which completely fails to address the central problems of the field, then even if it has better empirical coverage than a competitor theory B which does address the central problem of the field, then you should prefer B rather than A. But how do we apply this in practice? Could you give an example? Do you mean MP replacing P and P because of Darwin's problem?Alex Clarkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04634767958690153584noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-2708320296835945962013-07-06T20:57:03.887-07:002013-07-06T20:57:03.887-07:00Definitely - thanks for clarifying. ( I think I...Definitely - thanks for clarifying. ( I think I'm more sanguine about LI and similar journals than you are, though I get your point - but that's a separate conversation.)David Pesetskyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09666557087629655596noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-89074987601857714452013-07-06T19:42:09.764-07:002013-07-06T19:42:09.764-07:00Yes. Agreed. However, by 'empirical" I me...Yes. Agreed. However, by 'empirical" I mean the standard kinds of data points (e.g. *John was believed was arrested, *John saw that Mary loved himself, or Complementizer agreement shows you are wrong). I am happy with the quantitative descriptor: it's not a difference of kind but a difference of the abstractness of the empirical concerns. But your point is well taken.Norberthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15701059232144474269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-10745470265435544622013-07-06T19:38:54.384-07:002013-07-06T19:38:54.384-07:00Oh god, "Gloomy"! echh! I didn't wan...Oh god, "Gloomy"! echh! I didn't want to sound gloomy. Of course, you do what you can do and who knows how we get to the "truth," in many mysterious and convoluted ways I assume. We try what we can, we give the best arguments we can, we hope the gaps get filled in and we revel in our successes. By all means, just keep thinking and working. <br /><br />So why did I write my post? It was in response to a falsification incident that I witnessed that suggested that thinking abstractly was a waste of time UNLESS the obvious problems could be handled first. This is what I find unfortunate. This is the kind of demands I don't like and find unsupportable. It is rare that a similar criticism from the other end (i.e. it doesn't explain) is launched as a critique. So, I wanted to defend the uncommon practice of being led by theoretical concerns. These, I would argue are legitimate, even if they confront empirical hurdles, much as the empirically successful is ok even if it has little EO. I favor a pluralistic attitude, but I find that theorists are constantly invidiously criticized for valuingthe EO pole over the empirical one . I just wanted to argue that we should even out the score card. <br /><br />That agreed, go ahead and do the best you can. BOTH factors matter. I admire success however it comes. So long as we allow both kinds of research legitimacy, I'm fine and won't be the slightest bit cranky. However, as a matter of fact, I suspect that a paper to LI say has a better chance of being published if empirically heavy and explanatorily light than the reverse. And this, I believe indicates that the balance is not evenly weighted. This is what I object to. I don't intend (or want) to denigrate empirical research I just want to raise the respect for the more theoretical variety. I assume that you would agree?Norberthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15701059232144474269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-83044206860468070902013-07-06T17:37:24.278-07:002013-07-06T17:37:24.278-07:00It's not clear to me that the distinction betw...It's not clear to me that the distinction between (i) and (ii) is as clean as it's made out to be here. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding what exactly you mean by (i) and (ii), but if a proposal/theory explains something, that something is empirical.<br /><br />So, for example, grammatically competent humans being able to use and understand sentences never before encountered is an empirical phenomenon. To the extent that GB (or whatever theory) explains why this happens, it's explaining an observable fact.<br /><br />Based on the description of GB's explanatory purpose as an example of (ii) and the mention of "detailed analyses of specific phenomena" in the last paragraph, which I take to be an example of (i), it seems like the difference between (i) and (ii) is quantitative, not qualitative.Noah Motionhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00150446498549219747noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-51087916582924836422013-07-06T16:48:29.859-07:002013-07-06T16:48:29.859-07:00Norbert,
I agree with you, except (surprise!) whe...Norbert,<br /><br />I agree with you, except (surprise!) where you criticize me:<br /><br />"David has no problem relegating the big ‘why’ questions to 'the grand scheme of things' making it sound like some far off fairyland [...] suggesting that occasional daydreaming is fine."<br /><br />Not at all what I had in mind! And also I absolutely agree that we should always "try to keep our eyes on the explanatory prize and ask how what we are doing bears on these animating questions". The thing is, linguists are, I think, allowed to enjoy the journey as well as the destination. I thought your posting was a bit gloomy on that score. <br /><br />Also, I think (and maybe you disagree) there is a lot of proven value in linguistic investigations whose big-picture pay-off is unclear at the beginning of the project. Let me explain what I mean. I know of many great papers whose stated main point is a big-picture high-oomph idea. So you might think the linguist actually <i>began</i> by asking the big question, giving an exciting answer, and then going on a search for evidence -- but actually that's not what happened. The work really started with weeks of mucking around semi-aimlessly with crazy data from some language, asking low-level questions ("If we replace "Mary" with "John" do the judgments change?"), trying to figure out what the hell the data could be telling us -- and finally figuring out in an "aha" moment that (against all odds) the data bears on a deep question about FL that wasn't on anyone's mind when the project began. Then the paper gets written backwards (as it should be), with the big idea up front, and the evidence second, so the reader never knows how it all really happened. <br /><br />Why did I write my comments? Well, I just don't want linguists who are spending a happy month of July trying to figure out some weird verb to think they are going to get hit over the head by the Minimalist cops because they can't immediately say what the explanatory payoff will be. I've just seen too many "explanatory prizes" won by linguists whose path to Minimalist success was twisty and unpredictable to want to be too normative about doing linguistics.David Pesetskyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09666557087629655596noreply@blogger.com