tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post3992137955977191830..comments2024-03-28T04:04:55.806-07:00Comments on Faculty of Language: Linguistics and philosophyNorberthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15701059232144474269noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-10599744303913066352015-02-04T12:20:40.126-08:002015-02-04T12:20:40.126-08:00yes, I think aesthetics plays a crucial role in sc...yes, I think aesthetics plays a crucial role in science. I worked on automatic theorem proving a decade or more ago (when I was working on parsing as deduction). The big problem there is not so much generating correct logical deductions (our computers can generate millions of them a second) as figuring out when you've found something interesting or useful. Every deduction is correct, but most aren't insightful.<br /><br />I occasionally wonder whether there could be other intelligences ("space aliens") with the same laws of logic but with very different mathematics because their aesthetic sense is so different to ours.Mark Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05951121491616376798noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-72791816369965737582015-02-04T11:55:08.465-08:002015-02-04T11:55:08.465-08:00Of course I agree that very often it is the base s...Of course I agree that very often it is the base science that needs to be expanded; another example is how the gas laws relating temperature and pressure etc. were reduced to physics -- that only happened when an entirely new branch of physics (statistical thermodynamics) was invented. (Inconsistencies in the classical version of this theory led to quantum mechanics).<br /><br />I suspect we have much to learn about how the brain represents hierarchical structure (e.g., trees). The evidence for hierarchical structure in language is very strong, and while we might be mistaken about the details, any explanation of language that doesn't explain how and why it has words and phrases is missing something crucial. <br /><br />Thinking more about Chomsky's remarks on Cartesian mind / body dualism, I can easily imagine Chomsky agreeing with a twinkle in his eye that yes, dualism is scientifically untenable, but it's not because the mind is gone (which is what most of the audience would expect) but because Newton showed purely a mechanistic conception of the body has to be abandoned. <br /><br />Thanks for posting the Chomsky articles. They are always intriguing. <br /><br />It would be interesting to see what the field looks like in a century or two. It could be that neuroscience has advanced enough that we understand how minimalist computations are implemented in the brain. But it could be that some other empirical phenomenon (e.g., phonology, discourse?) is the wedge that lets us figure out the mind / brain connection. After all, those funny bands in the hydrogen spectrum played a crucial role in figuring out quantum mechanics. (Speaking of which, if I had to guess what kind of knowledge would be likely to be beyond the capacity of the human mind, quantum mechanics would be high on my list. Still, I guess we'll never know what facts are out there that we simply can't conceive of).<br /><br />Thanks,<br /><br />MarkMark Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05951121491616376798noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-79693657873747954122015-02-04T06:27:50.807-08:002015-02-04T06:27:50.807-08:00You ask a good question. Here's how I understa...You ask a good question. Here's how I understand things. The most important consequence of the dissolution of the classical mind/body problem is what it says about how unification is to proceed. In the classic version, we KNEW what physical forces HAD to be: contact mechanics. Thus, unification meant reduction to physics as we know the limits of physical explanation. Once we give this up, we don't actually know the "limits" of the physical; after all, if God can link gravity, an occult property to matter, then she can link anything to matter. Thus unification can go either in the direction of reduction or in a more roundabout way by changing the "reducing" science and leaving the "reduced" one more or less as is. This is exemplified by Chomsky's discussion of chemistry and physics. The classical mind body conception privileged physics and required that every other science march to its tune. With tis demise there is no preferred direction of unification: either the physics changes or the chemistry or both.<br /><br />So, no there is what has been called Broca's Question in language: how do brains realize minds. But with the demise of the classical mind/body conception there is no reason to believe that the neurologists have it right and the cognitivists have it wrong when the two clash. THe way I see it, what C is saying is that after Newton, the scientific playing field has been conceptually leveled. <br /><br />This also has a practical implication: it is critical to develop "bodies of doctrine" within a discipline as well as figuring out how to unify across them. And these bodies of doctrine must be taken seriously. So, if you want to exlain how brains do language, then you need to explain how brains to the kinds of things that linguists have discovered over the last 60 years. This stuff has an integrity and counts intellectually even if there is no Nobel Prize in cognition. In reading much of the neuro literature there is this sense that the important big shot science is neuro and mental matters must just toe the line when the two appear to be in conflict. This is a residue of the dualism that Newton exploded. C's point is that this posturing has no scientific merit anymore, as we just don't know the limits of the physical/neurological.<br /><br />That's how I see it. Norberthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15701059232144474269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-59867095663876377522015-02-04T06:15:47.116-08:002015-02-04T06:15:47.116-08:00You are, as usual, correct. I will try and remedy ...You are, as usual, correct. I will try and remedy this soon.Norberthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15701059232144474269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-13893727586692369712015-02-03T22:31:41.947-08:002015-02-03T22:31:41.947-08:00I'm not sure I'm correctly understanding C...I'm not sure I'm correctly understanding C's point about Newton destroying Cartesian dualism by destroying a purely contact-based mechanistic world; we all now believe in non-contact based forces like gravity. Is the point that we should stop worrying about how mental phenomena are instantiated in the brain, and just accept them as mysterious primitives?<br /><br />I think Chomsky elsewhere remarks that our understanding of the mind is not far beyond Aristotle's, but our physics would be incomprehensible to him, and suggests that perhaps this is because we humans are capable of comprehending physics but not the mind. That might be the case, but it could be wrong. After all, pretty much all the development of physics took place in the last few centuries; for millenia Aristotle ruled supreme in physics too.Mark Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05951121491616376798noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-29261526795875982812015-02-03T22:14:14.841-08:002015-02-03T22:14:14.841-08:00I think you got the quote wrong -- English is infi...I think you got the quote wrong -- English is infinite but not limitless.Mark Johnsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05951121491616376798noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-84935190104595730252015-02-03T11:46:19.316-08:002015-02-03T11:46:19.316-08:00Largely off topic, but I’m intrigued how the agent...Largely off topic, but I’m intrigued how the agent nominalization of ‘generative grammar’ is ‘generative grammarian’ because of ‘grammar’, but Norbert’s agent nominalization of ‘GG’ is ‘GGer’ and not *‘GGian’. Phonotactics of -ian? Regularity of -er?James Crippenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10927937760368098278noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5275657281509261156.post-25403268229014085092015-02-02T18:31:31.509-08:002015-02-02T18:31:31.509-08:00On a very related theme. The present issue of the ...On a very related theme. The present issue of the New Yorker has a profile of Yitang Zhang, the mathematician of the twin primes fame. Not a particularly good piece but one of the themes is the beauty of mathematics. A beautiful proof "should resemble a simple and clear-cut constellation, not a scattered cluster in the Milky Way." Zhang's proof has "a renaissance beauty, meaning that though it is deeply complex, its outlines are easily apprehended. The pursuit of beauty in pure mathematics is a tenet." <br /><br />Now of course. "Last year, neuroscientists in Great Britain discovered that the same part of the brain that is activated by art and music was activated in the brains of mathematicians when they looked at math they regarded as beautiful". <br /><br />Do they have to ruin everything?Charles Yanghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06041398285400095406noreply@blogger.com