Here’s an
interesting piece by Nick Evans on the indigenous languages of Australia. It is
imbued with a sensibility concerning the study of language quite different than
my own (which is partly why I found it interesting) but it also raises some
questions that someone who approaches linguistic questions from my direction
should find intriguing. In what follows I will discuss both points of con- and
di-vergence. But before starting, let me reiterate that I found the piece
intriguing and I could imagine spending quite a bit of pleasant time over
several cold beers talking to Nick about his work, which is a long-winded way
of saying that you should take a look at the piece for yourself.[1]
Some comments:
(1) Nick worries about a question whose utility from where I
sit is not at all evident: How to distinguish a language from a dialect (see 4).
This is in service of trying to establish the integrity of the Australian
language family, which is in turn in service of trying to estimate how fast
languages change and how old language families are. The idea that Nick moots is
that the Australian language family is 60,000 years old and that this raises
the possibility that the emergence of the Faculty
of Language is much older still. In other words, Nick takes the dating of
the language family question as bearing on the emergence of the FL question.
Clearly, the second one is of interest to devotees of the Minimalist Program.
However, I am not sure that I would take the question as
nearly as well posed as Nick does. I do not see that there is a principled way
of distinguishing languages from dialects. The one that he proposes is the
following: “a language is something that is distinct enough to needs its own
distinctive descriptive grammar” (5). But what does ‘distinctive enough’ mean?
Darn if I know. For me a G is a mental construct. It is almost certain that no
two Gs are the same (i.e. no two people have exactly the same Gs). So the question is one of more or less. But
so far as I know this becomes a question of G overlap and the degree of overlap
will not be precise. But we need some measure of this to see how different two
Gs are so as to get a measure of G difference and hence, change. Maybe such measures exist, but I know of
none, and unless one specifies some dimensions of similarity (which may exist
(recall, I am no expert on these matters)) then the rate of change issue
becomes hard to specify.
This said, if we could
establish a rate of G change then this might be useful in establishing how old
FL is, and given that the only evidence we have for when it emerged is indirect
(the emergence of complex cultural artifacts (i.e. the big bang)) this would be
useful. That said, I doubt that it would significantly alter the backdrop for
Darwin’s Problem as it applies to language. The big fact is that FL appeared
more or less in one piece and it has not evolved since. There is no indication from what Nick writes
that these older Gs are qualitatively different from contemporary ones. This
means that the FL required to acquire them is effectively the same as the one
that we still possess. And if that is the case then the logic of Darwin’s
Problem as it applies to MP remains unchanged. So far as someone with my
interests is concerned, that is enough.
Let me add a question before moving on: is there a measure
of G change (or the more ambitious rate
of G change?) out there? Note that this
would be a measure of how Gs of the same
language change. This seems to require reifying languages so that two Gs can be Gs of the same language even if
different in detail. So far as I know, modern GG has only an inchoate
qualitative purchase on the notion of a language, and it has not been important
to make it more precise. In fact, it is part of a dispensable idealization
concerning ideal-speaker hearers. Nick’s project requires theoretically grounding
the informal notion sufficient for most GG inquiries. I am skeptical, but wish
him luck.
(2) Nick raises a second question: why are there so many
languages anyhow (8ff)? He asks this in
order to focus efforts on identifying “the social processes that drive
differentiation.” I also find this question interesting, but in a slightly
different way. From my perspective, Gs
are products of three factors: (i) the structure of FL/UG, (ii) the nature of
the PLD (the input data that the LAD uses to construct its G given the options
FL/UG allows) and (iii) the learning theory that LADs use to organize the PLD
and uses to construct a particular G given (i) and (ii).[2]
The question I find interesting is why FL/UG makes so many Gs available. Why
not simply hardwire in one G and be done with it? Why is FL/UG so open textured
and environmentally sensitive (i.e. open to the effects of PLD)? Note, that
FL/UG could have specified one G in
the species (say all Gs have more or less the syntax of “English”). This is
roughly what happens in some songbirds: all birds of a species sing the same
song. Why isn’t this what happened for language? In P&P terms this would
mean an FL/UG with no parameters. Why don’t we have this? And does the fact that we don’t have this
tell us anything interesting about FL/UG?
There are
several possibilities. Mark Baker has offered a kind of evolutionary rationale.
He thinks that Gs are codes that enable speakers of the same language to conceal information from outsiders (here:8):
Suppose
that the language faculty has a concealing function as well as a revealing
function. Our language faculty could have the purpose of communicating complex
propositional information to collaborators while concealing it from rivals that might be
listening in.
I say evolutionary, for I am assuming that it is because
concealment can confer selective advantages that we have such a code. Though an
ingenious idea, I am skeptical for the obvious reasons. This parameterized
coding scheme is now species wide and anyone can acquire any of the coding schemes
(aka Gs) if placed in the right linguistic environment. If the goal was opacity useful for segregating
in groups form out groups then one can imagine schemes that would make it impossible (or at least very difficult)
for outlanders to acquire the code would have been a superior option. But so
far as we can tell, all humans are equally adept at learning any G (i.e. set of
parameter values). Perhaps what Mark has in mind is that it is hard to learn a
non native G later in life and this suffices for whatever advantages concealment
promotes. Maybe.
I have remarked before, that parametrization is a very
curious fact (if it is a fact) (here),
one that suggests that, contrary to standard assumptions, typological
difference tell us very little about the structure of FL. However, putting this
to one side, it is interesting that Gs can be so different and Nick’s question
of why there is so much variation is a good one.
What’s his answer? There are social processes that drive
differentiation and we need to identify these. He suggests two steps (8-9):
The first step is to see how new linguistic elements
are born: new sounds, new grammatical structures, new words, new meanings. What
makes the range of these more or less diverse in different groups? For example,
does being multilingual add options to the pool? ...
The second step is to find how the society promotes
one variant over another. It is clear that some groups have linguistic
ideologies that place a high premium on harnessing linguistic means to say “Our
clan is different”, “our moiety is different” and so on…
This might be right so far as it goes, but it presupposes
that FL/UG allows all of these
options to begin with. In other words, given
that FL allows diverse Gs what drives the specific diversity we see. Baker
(and me) are interested in another question: why does FL allow the diversity to
begin with. What’s wrong with an FL that, as it were, had no parameters at all?
Here’s my thought: an FL with fixed parameters is more
biologically expensive than an open textured one. The idea is that if evolution
can rely on there always being enough PLD to allow a child to acquire the local
G then there is no reaons for evolution to code information in the genome that
the PLD makes readily available. If fixing info in the genome is costly then it
will not be put there unless it must be. So, an open textured system is what we
should expect. That’s the idea.
I think that this fits pretty well with MP thinking as
well. If what allows FL to emerge is a small
addition, say an operation like Merge, (an addition that remains very stable
and unchanging over time) then given that Merge is consistent with various
surface differences then so long as the non linguistic proprietary parts of FL
suffice with Merge to generate Gs then we should not expect more linguistic proprietary info to be
biologically coded. If Merge is enough, then it’s all that we will get. Note,
that this suggests that MP like systems will not likely have an FL/UG
specification of a particular parameter space (see here
and here
for some discussion). If this can be fleshed out, then the reason we have G
diversity is that fixed parameters are costly and MP takes FL to be what we get
we add only a smidgen of linguistically proprietary structure to an otherwise
language ready cognitive system. In other words, typologically diversity (PLD
sensitive G generation) is just what MP ordered.
(3) Nick provides sort
of an antidote for my tolerance for inferring UG principles from the
properties of a single G. As he puts it (12-3):
We are just coming out of half a century where generative
linguistics, as inspired by the great linguist Noam Chomsky, placed great
emphasis on ‘Universal Grammar’, very much seeing all languages as alike with
only minor variations. Part of this emphasis meant claiming there are all sorts
of imaginable design options that are simply not found in language. For
example, Steven Pinker and Paul Bloom wrote, in the early 90s, that ‘‘no
language uses noun affixes to express tense’’. Now clearly this is simply wrong
for Kayardild. It is an example of what can go wrong, scientifically, when one
extrapolates prematurely from too limited a range of cases. Now there’s nothing
wrong with the scientific strategy of making strong statements to invite
falsification. But what Kayardild shows us – and many other languages I could
have used to illustrate the structural originality of Australian languages, in
different ways – is that we really need to get out there and describe
languages, as they are, to realize the full richness and diversity of how
humans have colonized the design space of language through the languages they
have built through use.
I say “sort of” because Nick’s observations are not
couched in terms of Gs but in terms of languages and the problems he cites have
less to do with the properties of Gs than with their surface manifestations.
Chomsky did not (and does not) see “all languages alike.” What he saw/sees was/is
that all I-languages are pretty much alike. Missing the ‘I’ prefix
threatens confusing Chomsky for Greenberg. I can understand that if one’s interest
are mainly typological and that diversity is what gets you excited then
dropping the ‘I’ will seem like the best way to import Chomsky’s insights into
your work. But this is a mistake (as you knew I would say). It is not the
diversity of languages that we need to investigate if your goal is GGish, but
the diversity of Gs and these will only be indirectly related to surface
patterns we observe. The Pinker-Bloom example is very much a Greenberg
conception of universal at least as Nick takes it to be refuted by Kyardild (it
appears to deal with features of overt affixes). If we are to learn about FL/UG
by exploring the rich “design space of language” then we need to keep in mind
that it is I-language space we should
be exploring. Moreover, when it comes to I-language
space I am less sure than Nick is that
[t]he world of languages holds more possibilities
than any linguist has imagined, and Australian languages have taken the ‘design
space’ in lots of rare and unusual directions, so that we’re still finding new
phenomena that people hadn’t imagined before (14).
In fact, from where I sit, we have actually found
relatively few new universals since
the mid 1980s. If this is correct, oddly, exploring the ‘design space’ has
enriched our understanding of language diversity but has left our understanding
of I-language variation pretty much
where it was when only a small number of languages served as linguistic model
organisms.[3]
That’s it. I think that Nick has asked some interesting
questions, the most interesting being why FL/UG allows G variation. We are
interested in different things, but the paper was fun to read and Kayardild sounds
like it can take you on a wild ride. Like I said, I’d love to have a beer with
him.
[1]
Thx to Kleanthes for sending me the URL.
[3]
See
here for a partial list. The observant reader will note that most of these
are very old. It would be nice to have some candidate universals that are of
more recent vintage, say discovered in the last 20 years. If my hunch is right
that recent contributions to the list have been sparse of late, this is
interesting and worth trying to understand.
@Norbert: I don't understand your point about tense affixes on nouns and the I-language / E-language divide. You're right that "Kayardild has tense affixes on its nouns" is a statement about an E-language, since there really isn't such a thing as "Kayardild" any more than there is such a thing as "English" – there's just the mental representation of the grammar necessary to generate an I-language in the Kayardild- (or English-) speaking individual.
ReplyDeleteSo far so good, but how is the step from "Kayardild has tense affixes on its nouns" to "the mental grammar of the idealized Kayardild-speaking individual generates tense affixes on its nouns" different from the step from "English has no overt subjects in the infinitival complement of 'try'" to "the mental grammar of the idealized English-speaking individual disallows overt subjects in the infinitival complement of 'try'"? And if these inferential steps are not qualitatively different, then ceteris paribus we can take this to be a fact about possible I-languages. And so, if we take the Pinker-Bloom statement to be one about possible I-languages, then I think Kayardild does indeed falsify a putative universal concerning possible I-languages.
Now, all of this is separate from the question of whether the Pinker-Bloom statement ("no language uses noun affixes to express tense") is or isn't a candidate for the status of Chomskyan universal. Let me put this another way: you could imagine Greenbergian universals stated over E-languages (as I believe Greenberg intended them to be), or as universals stated over I-languages (which is what I was entertaining above). "Greenbergian I-universals," if you will. If your interests are at the granularity of Merge, then I can see how this Pinker-Bloom hypothesis would seem irrelevant from your perspective; but I can easily see someone who is interested in differences between syntactic categories seeing the same hypothesis as a candidate to be a Chomskyan universal: "if a language has a reliable noun-verb distinction, then ..." And then you could imagine that if a language had no noun-verb distinction (I have not seen a convincing case that such languages exist, but let's put that aside), it would not bear on this issue, because it is a Chomskyan rather than Greenbergian universal.
In short: from where I sit, while it might be true that all universals stated over E-languages are Greenbergian, the converse is not true.
I largely agree with Omer's comment, specifically I worry about making the separation between Chomsky universals and Greenberg universals so sharp that Chomsky universals don't have any observable consequences. (I've commented on this point before.)
ReplyDeleteBut I take it that the important point for Norbert is that Evans apparently takes the reported facts to contradict the emphasis on "seeing all languages as alike with only minor variations". So it all comes down to what sort of variation one takes to be "minor". If you focus on the word-sequences that get externalized, then the difference between putting a tense marker or a case marker on a single word versus putting it on some large span of the sentence might not seem particularly minor. Whereas if you focus on the mental generative procedure and think about case marking as some dependency that gets established between two nodes of a tree, then seeing overt case marking appear on all words dominated by one of the involved nodes is more likely to seem like a "minor variation". (I don't know anything about the details of Kayardild case-marking, haven't even read Evans' description particularly carefully, and make no claims about exactly well it fits into modern theories of case, but I think the general point can stand that what you take to be "minor" will differ depending on the Chomskyan versus Greenbergian perspective.)
If I remember right, the future tense marker in Kayardild appears on all non-subject NP/DPs. Don't remember the details, but Kayardild also has case-stacking.
ReplyDeleteYes, there's a book about it here: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/kayardild-morphology-and-syntax-9780199654871?cc=au&lang=en&.
DeleteAlso the author has a Yale PhD thesis online.
The theoretical bite here is that the workings of these languages, easily accessible to anybody from about 1995 (Evans' book, the Plank's Double Case book, Sadock's autolexical analysis), show that it is completely impossible to make morphological marking dependent on structural adjacency, but this idea clung on at least till 2008, in Baker's Agreement book, and I am not entirely convinced that it has been eradicated from everybody's minds yet (although it is clearly gone from those of many people). Whereas, the final date after which it should have become untenable would have been 1998, when Rachel Nordlinger's book on Case appeared, but it lingered on for another decade or so, until Norvin Richard's work on Lardil became available.
DeleteMy impression is that people do take linguistic diversity seriously now to a considerably greater extent than they did in 1995, but the extent to which practice has shifted is not recognized either in the MP community or outside of it, and the exposition of the theoretical framework still looks to me like a complete mess.
@Avery: thanks for the references!
Delete> In fact, from where I sit, we have actually found relatively few new universals since the mid 1980s.
ReplyDeleteIs there a list?
See note 3.
Delete