This note is spurred by some points made by Alex Clark (here):
Every scientific theory aims for truth. This is not the exclusive goal of
falsificationism. However, finite beings that we are we cannot gaze directly at
a theory and see if it is true or not. Hence we look for marks or signature properties
of truth and falsity. Falsificationism puts great weight on one of these
features and lesser weight on others. The first virtue, and not first among
equals, is "getting the facts right." Non-naive falsificationists
(e.g. Lakatos) then gussy this all up to the point that the method turns out to
be "do the best you can realizing that it's a complex mess." This, of
course, is a nice version of Feyerabend's "anything goes" but said
more politely. I personally like Percy Bridgeman's version: "use your
noodle and no holds bared." The net effect of these methodological
nostrums is to make them impossible to apply qua method for there is nothing
methodical about them. Given the (apparently) insatiable desire for mechanistic
answers to complex issues, people fall back onto "covering the data"
as the best applicable proxy. And this is where the problem arises.
The problem is two fold: (i) what the relevant data are is
not self evident, (ii) this leads to ignoring all the stuff that makes the
non-naïve approaches non-naïve. So, in practice, what we get is a ham handed
application of the sophisticated views that, in practice, is just our old
friend naïve falsificationism.
Let me say a quick word about (i). Naivety often begins with a robust sense of
what the data is. As the sophisticates
know, this is hardly self-evident. So take an example close to the home of
some: does Kobele’s work demonstrate once and for all that natural language
grammars are not mildly context sensitive because they fail to display constant
growth? I have not witnessed mass recantations of the MCS view from my
computational colleagues. No, what I have seen is attempts (actually more often
hopes that some attempts would be forthcoming) to reanalyze the morphological
and syntactic data (pronounced copies) so that it is defanged.
Let me add that I am entirely sympathetic to this effort in
principle. It’s what we do all the time and it is one way that we try to protect our favored accounts. We do this not (merely) out of a misplaced
love of our own creations (but who doesn’t love her own mental products?) but
because often our favorite theories have EO that would be lost were it rendered
false. Moreover, the more that would be lost the more rational it is to ask for
a high level of proof before we give up on the old theory, and even then we
will demand of the replacement that it get the previous theories successes
right (usually as limit cases).
My main point has been that we should extend a similar set
of considerations to theories with high EO/low BI. But in order to do this we must try to keep
firmly in mind what the central targets of explanation are. This is why Plato’s
and Darwin’s problems are so important. Yes, they are vague and need
precisfication. But they are not powerless and can be used to evaluate
proposals. They, in other words, provide a second axis of evaluation in
addition to “data coverage” for theory evaluation.
Two last points: First, there are other factors in addition to the two mooted above that
serve as marks of truth: simplicity, elegance, Occamite stuff, etc. These have served to advance thinking and are
very hard to make precise, hence the injunction to “use your noodle.” Second,
arguments gain in persuasiveness the more local they are. These dicta, though very vague in the
abstract are remarkably clear when applied in local circumstances, at least
most of the time. As Alex Drummond has
repeatedly noted: it’s often all too easy to recognize a counter-example/bit of
recalcitrant relevant data when it
comes flying your way. Same with EO, elegance, etc. In particular contexts, these high-flying
notions get tied down and can become useful. The aim of lots of theoretical
work is to figure out how to do this. However, not surprisingly, this is more
art than technique, and hence the disagreements about what factor should weigh
most heavily in deciding which way to turn. My view, is that in this hubbub we
should not loose sight of the animating problems and discount them in favor of
what is more easily at hand. Further, in my view, this is precisely what
falsificationism encourages.
