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Showing posts with label Hauser. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hauser. Show all posts

Monday, September 30, 2013

Evilicious


As I have noted in the past, Andrew Gelman, a statistician at Columbia (and someone whose work I both follow and have learned from) has a bee in his bonnet about Marc Hauser (and, it seems, Chomsky) (see here).  In many of his posts he has asserted that Hauser fraudulently published material that he knew to be false, and this is why he takes such a negative view of Hauser (and those like Chomsky who have been circumspect in their criticisms).  Well, Hauser has a new book out Evilicious (see here for a short review). Interestingly, the book has a blurb from Nicholas Wade, the NYTs science writer that covered the original case. More interestingly the post provides links to Wade’s coverage for the NYT of the original “case” and because I have nothing better to do with my time I decided to go back and read some of that coverage.  It makes for very interesting reading.  Here are several points that come out pretty clearly:

1.     The case against Hauser was always quite tenuous (see here and here).  Of the papers for which he as accused of fabrication, two were replicated very quickly to the satisfaction of Science’s referees. The problem for these was not fabrication, but not having the original tapes readily available.  Sloppy? Perhaps. Fraud? No evidence here.
2.     Of the eight charges of misconduct, five involved unpublished material.  This is a very high standard. I would be curious to know how many other scientists would like to be held responsible for what they did not publish.  A Dr. Galef from McMaster University (here) notes incredulously in the NYT (rightly in my view): “How in the world can they get in trouble for data they didn’t publish?”
3.     L’Affaire Hauser then devolves down to one experiment published in Cognition that Galef notes “was very deeply flawed.” However, as I noted (here) the results have since been replicated. That, like the Science replications, suggests that the original paper was not as flawed as supposed. Sloppy? Yes. Flawed? Perhaps (the replication suggests that what was screwed up did not matter much). Fraud? Possible, but the evidence is largely speculative.
4.     The NYT’s pieces provide a pretty good case that (at least one) outside scientists, who reviewed the case against Hauser, thought that “the accusations were unfounded.” Maybe Galef is a dupe, but his creds look ok to me. At any rate, someone with expertise in Hauser’s field reviewed the evidence against him and concluded that there was not enough evidence to conclude fraud, or anything close to it.
5.     Galef further noted that the Harvard investigating committee did not include people familiar with “the culture of an animal behavior laboratory,” which has “a different approach to research and data-keeping” than what one finds in other domains, especially the physical sciences from which the members of the Harvard investigating committee appeared to come from. I’m pretty sure that few behavioral or Social scientists would like to be subject to the standards of experimental hygiene characteristic of the work in the physical sciences. Is it possible that in the investigation that set the tone for what followed, Hauser was not judged by scientists with the right background knowledge?
6.     The final ORI report concentrates on the retracted (subsequently replicated) Cognition article (here). The claim is that “half the data in the graph were fabricated.” Maybe. It would be nice to know what the ORI based this judgment on. All involved admit that the experimental controls were screwed up and that some of the graphs, as reported, did not reflect the experiments conducted. I have no trouble believing that there was considerable sloppiness (though to repeat, it seems not to have been fatal given the subsequent replication), but this would not support ORI’s assertion of fabrication, a term that carries the connotation of intentional deceit.  I suspect that the ORI judgment rests on the prior Harvard findings. This leaves me thinking: why did this particular set of data get through the otherwise pretty reliable vetting process in Hauser’s lab, one that nixed earlier questionable data?  Recall, the data from five of the other investigated papers were vetted before being sent out and as a result the reported data were changed. What happened in this case? Why did this one slip through? I can understand ORI’s conclusion if tons of published data was fabricated. But this is precisely what there is no evidence for. Why then this one case?  Is it so unlikely that some goof up casued the slip? As Altmann, one of Hauser’s early accusers, notes in the NYT: “It is conceivable that the data were not fabricated, but rather that the experiment was set up wrong, and that nobody realized this until after it was published.” In the end, does the whole case against Hauser really devolve to what happened in this one case? With effectively one set of controls? Really?

I suspect that the real judgment against Hauser rests on the fact that he resigned from Harvard and that the Harvard committee initially set up to investigate him (but whose report, so far as I know, has never been publically made available) decided he was guilty. Again, as Altmann notes in the NYT: his earlier accusation was “heavily dependent on the knowledge that Harvard found Professor Hauser guilty of misconduct.” This, coupled with the thought that Hauser would not have quit were he innocent. But, it’s not a stretch to think of many reasons why a non-guilty person might quit, being fed up with one’s treatment perhaps topping the list. I am not saying that this is why Hauser resigned. I don’t know. But to conclude that he must be guilty because he left Harvard (who but a criminal would leave this august place, right? Though on second thought…) is hardly an apodictic conclusion. In fact, given all the evidence to date, it strikes me that the charges of fraud have very little evidential support, and that there are decent alternative explanations for what took place absent the intention to deceive. In fact, I would suggest that given the gravity of the charge, we should set a pretty high evidential bar before confidently declaring fraud. As far as I can tell from reading what’s in the NYT, this bar has not been remotely approached, let alone cleared.

I think that this will be the last post on this topic for me.  I have harped on it because, frankly, I think Hauser got a raw deal, from what I can tell, and that the condemnations he drew down on himself struck me as a tad too smug, uninformed, and self satisfied. As I’ve said before: fraud does not seem to me to be the biggest source of data pollution, nor the hardest one to root out.  However, such charges are serious and should not be leveled carelessly. Careers are at stake. And from what I can tell, in this particular case, Hauser was not given the benefit of the doubt, as he should have been.   

Thursday, September 19, 2013

Faking it


Andrew Gelman, a statistician at Columbia (and one whose opinions I generally respect (I read his blog regularly) and whose work, to the degree that I understand it, I really like), has a thing about Hauser (here).[1] What offends him are Hauser’s (alleged) data faking (yes, I use ‘alleged’ because I have personally not seen the evidence, only heard allegations, and given how easy these are to make, well, let's just try not to jump to comfortable conclusions). Here he explains why the “faking” is so bad, not rape, murder or torture bad, but science wise bad. Why? Because  what fake data does is “waste people’s time (and some lab animals’ lives) and slow down the progress of science.” Color me skeptical.

Here’s what I mean: is this a generic claim or one specific to Hauser’s work?  If the latter, then I would like to see the evidence that his alleged improprieties had any such effect. Let me remind you again (see here, here,) that the results of all of Hauser’s papers that were questioned have since been replicated. Thus, the conclusions of these papers stand. Anyone who relied on them to do their research did just fine.  Was there a huge amount of time and effort wasted? Did lab animals get used in vain? Maybe. What’s the evidence? And maybe not. They all replicated. Moreover, if the measure of his crime is wasted time and effort, did Hauser’s papers really lead down more blind alleys and wild goose chases then your average unreplicable psych or neuro paper (here).

As for the generic claim, I would like to see more evidence for this as well.  Among the “time wasters” out there, is faked data really the biggest problem, or even a very big problem?  Or is this sort of like Republican "worries" about fake voters inundating the polls and voting for Democrats? My impression is that the misapplication of standard statistical techniques to get BS results that fail to replicate are far more problematic (see here and here). If this is so, then Gelman’s fake data worries, by misdirection, may be leading us away from the more serious time wasters, i.e. it diverts attention from the real time sinks, viz. the production of non-replicable “results,” which, so far as I can tell is closely tied to the use of BS statistical techniques to coax significance in one out of every 20 or so experiments. We should be so lucky that the main problem is fakery!

So that I am not misunderstood, let me add, that nobody I know condones faking data. But this is not because it in some large measure retards the forward march of science (this claim may be true, but it is not a truism), but because faking is quite generally bad. Period (again, not unlike voter fraud). And it should not be practiced or condoned for the same reason that lying, bullying, and plagiarism should not be practiced or condoned. These are all lousy ways to behave.  However, that said, I have real doubts that fake data is the main problem holding back so many of the “sciences,” and claiming otherwise without evidence can misdirect attention from where it belongs. The main problem with many of the “sciences” is absence of even a modicum of theory, i.e. lack of insight (i.e. absence of any idea about what’s going on), and all the data mining in the world cannot substitute for one or two really good ideas. The problem I have with Gelman’s obsession is that in the end it suggests a view of science that I find wrongheaded: that data mining is what science is all about. As the posts noted above indicate, I could not disagree more.


[1] This is just the latest of many posts on this topic. Gelman, for some reason I cannot fathom, also has a thing about Chomsky, as flipping through his blog will demonstrate (e.g. here, and here).