I was going to write something long and pointed in response
to this
new piece by Vyvyan Evans (VE). I was going to analyze the article noting
its inflated combination of self-pity (those “Chomsky disciples” are saying
that my work is junk) and self-aggrandizement (I am the leader of a Kuhnian
paradigm shift that will overthrow the Chomskyan orthodoxy that, prior to the heroic
efforts of people like me, who are now being viciously pilloried by the
intellectually enervated Generative establishment, has had a stranglehold on
linguistic pedagogy). I was going to note that VE has yet to address a single
criticism leveled against his work,
preferring instead to personalize the disagreement in a two fold manner; first
by noting his personal travails in fighting the Chomskyan dragon and second by citing
the approval of various authorities and luminaries that think him and his work
wonderful. However, despite the obvious temptations that VE’s public demeanor
make almost irresistible, his latest piece has convinced me that nothing much
will be gained by doing this (fun as it may be).[1]
The reason is that so far VE has provided every kind of reply to the criticisms
leveled against his work except one that addresses the identified problems with
his chief “arguments” (and yes, these are scare quotes). These number three.[2]
1. VE’s
work fails to grasp the difference between a Greenberg and a Chomsky Universal.
As such its putative arguments against UG are logically insufficient to get to
their desired conclusions (see here
and here).[3]
2. The
positions VE’s work identifies and argues against are (regularly and
repeatedly) caricatures based on egregious serial misquotation. In particular,
the texts that VE’s work cites are very selectively quoted from and when the
originals are consulted it is clear that the quoted authors are making the
exact opposite points from the ones that VE’s work attributes to them (see here
and links therein).
3. The
detailed linguistic arguments VE delivers are inadequate. Not only does the
work evidence no understanding of the larger conceptual issues like those in
(1) above, it even screws up the technical analytic details (see here
for one example examined in detail).
Let’s review these three points again one last time.
First, VE really does not understand what is logically necessary to make his case.
This is because VE (still) does not understand how the ‘Universal’ in
‘Universal Grammar’ means. Let me elaborate.
There are two basic conceptions of universal in the
linguistics literature. Let’s call them Greenberg Universals (GU) and Chomsky
Universals (CU). GUs aim to describe surface patterns common to all languages.
GUs thus focus on word order patterns (both prevalent and absent, absolute and
statistical) such as the rarity of OVS patterns across the world’s languages
and the prevalence of SVO and SOV. GET THE NUMBER OF THESE There are other GUs
as well, and some have been the focus of some interesting discussion in the
Generative literature in the last several years.[4]
However, whatever the theoretical and empirical interest of such GUs, they are different from what Generativists of the
Chomsky stripe have meant by ‘universal.’ How so?
Well, CUs do note refer to surface linguistic patterns but
to properties of the Faculty of Language (FL) and the formal and substantive
restrictions FL imposes on competence grammars (G). Let’s unpack this a bit by
taking an example or two of a proposed CU.
A popular CU is the principle that restricts G rules to structure
dependent operations (i.e. the G rules are stated in terms of structural
features of phrase markers rather than linear properties of strings). Another
popular one restricts “movement rules” from applying across islands. A third
example is the principle that restricts anaphoric elements from c-commanding
their antecedents. These have been proposed
as candidate Universals (i.e. principles that delimit the range of possible
grammatical operations and relations, thereby restricting the class of admissible
generative procedures available to humans). Note, that CUs refer not to surface outputs like GUs do but
to the properties of the Gs that generate a given linguistic object’s
meaning-sound outputs. As such, CUs are only indirectly related to surface patterns.
So UG on a CU conception is a description of the restrictions
that FL places on the kinds of Gs that human natural languages allow. Thus, on
a CU conception, UG describes the general characteristics of human Gs and also thereby
limns (some of) the fine structure of the higher-level capacity that humans
have which undergirds their capacity to acquire the kinds of Gs that they in
fact acquire. Note that empirically investigating CUs logically requires going beyond the inspection of surface distributions
(in contrast to GUs). It logically requires
investigating the features of Gs. And this requires moving beyond observed surface
patterns to the underlying Gs that generates them.
So, say you think that this CU conception of UG and FL is
hogwash, how do you argue against it? Well, you need to show (most ambitiously)
that Gs can have arbitrary structure
(i.e. there is no limit to the kinds
of rules, operations and structures that human Gs can have) or (more modestly) you
must demonstrate that the universals that GGers have actually proposed are
wrong. VE’s work does neither, or does neither competently (see below). Why
not? Well here is my diagnosis: VE’s arguments completely fail because VE does
not understand the difference between a GU and a CU. How would this explain VE’s practice? It
would explain why VE’s main argument against UG has the structure it does. What
is that structure? It amounts to the assertion (i) that natural languages
display a very wide variety of surface variations and (ii) that this attested
variation in the world’s languages implies (or, more modestly, strongly
suggests) that there are no CUs. But this, to repeat, is a non-sequitur, unless, of course one takes CUs to be GUs, which, to
repeat, they are not!
More specifically, the confusion between GUs and CUs vitiates
VE’s arguments as follows: though surface variation directly bears on GU
claims, it has an indirect relation to whether
there are CUs. To demonstrate that surface variation undermines UG in the CU
sense requires showing that surface variation implies unbounded G variation. But nobody’s work has ever shown that, and
certainly not VE’s. Indeed, VE’s work has not even tried to show this. Rather
it has simply asserted (and asserted
and asserted and…) that the evident linguistic surface variation found among
the world’s languages (which, btw, is not really news to GGers, at least not
for the last 40 years) undermines claims for UG.
In sum, VE’s work has not demonstrated that surface
variation requires different kinds of G rules, nor has it discussed the rather
extensive empirical literature that aims to show how very different surface
patterns can all be generated using the same basic kinds of Gs. As this has
been one of the mainstays of GG research over the last 40 years (and there are
literally thousands of pages that have been written on tupological variation by
GGers), this means that VE’s work has not discussed the empirical literature relevant to making even the modest claim
against UG noted above. Rather, VE’s work reduces to the assertion of a logical
non-sequitur (incessantly repeated as if repeating the same thing again and
again and again and… boosts its verisimilitude)[5];
because languages display a very large variety of distinct surface patterns therefore the Gs that generate these
patterns cannot have common properties.[6]
Let me note, in a charitable vein, that the confusion
between GUs and CUs is understandable. Undergrads confuse them all the time.
VE’s work does too. Consequently, VE’s arguments are based on a pun (i.e.
confusing two uses of the concept ‘universal’) and hence cannot hope to show
what they intend. In other words, VE’s arguments are prime examples of the
fallacy of equivocation. This is one very important reason why these arguments
are worthless (dare I say junk!).[7]
So the first problem with EV’s criticism of Chomskyan GG is
that it is based on an equivocation and is thus without intellectual interest
(though sociologically, well, that’s another matter). However, this is not the worst thing about
VE’s critique, for one might argue that this is a rather subtle mistake
(though, it really isn’t). The two other problems with his work are that it is
both dishonest and incompetent. Let’s
take these in turn.
First the dishonesty. It has been amply demonstrated that
VE’s work has troubles with quotation. David Pesetsky deserves credit for
making this point repeatedly in e-discussions with VE. The same point has also
been made by others (see here
and links therein for a particularly clear set of detailed examples). This
egregious misquotation alone should have made the work unpublishable. It
certainly suggests that the “review” process that CUP conducted was far from
thorough.[8]
I strongly urge those skeptical of my claims to take a careful look at the
relevant discussions linked to above. The misquotation is really appalling
given that it consistently attributes to people the opposite positions to the
ones that they are actually offering and then criticizing them on the basis of
the severely distorted misquoted passages.
Last but not least, VE’s work is technically incompetent. VE
appears not to know his way around a syntactic argument, at least as regards
the work he criticizes. This further vitiates VE’s work. After all, one very
good rule of critical thumb is that one know something about what one is
criticizing. So if you want to criticize the Chomskyan view of universals then
you should know a lot about the arguments for and against them. VE’s work is
sadly lacking in this respect. I have gone over one example in detail here.
EV’s discussion here gets everything wrong; from the description of the
relevant data to be explained to the typological contrast at issue to the
sentences relevant to adjudicating the claims. In other words, it is technically wrong in every possible way.
An undergrad that submitted this as a homework would not have been happy with
the resulting grade. Once again, this suggests that the six who reviewed VE’s
work for CUP were either not expert in the relevant fields or, just as likely,
did not read the book carefully before pronouncing on its merits. These are
intro to syntax errors. CUP clearly needs a better vetting process.
As noted at the outset, I intend this to be my last post on
VE’s work. I know that I have sounded harsh, but that’s because I wanted to
sound harsh as the work VE has produced is really very bad. It is confused,
incompetent and more than a tad dishonest.
IMO, this makes it junk in the sense that it teaches us nothing about
the vices or virtues of the Chomskyan Generative program. In fact, it’s worse than
that: it cannot teach us anything, as
the arguments are based on misquotation, equivocation and technical
incompetence. This is why I have repeatedly called it ‘junk.’
However, the fact that this work has been published, and
apparently endorsed by many luminaries, is insightful. It tells us a lot about
the intellectual atmosphere that surrounds us. IMO, most of this junk stems
from a resurgent Empiricism, a particularly crude version in fact. For reasons
I actually do not well understand, the idea that humans are built to speak is
considered provocative. The further possibility that this native capacity is in
some ways domain specific is considered by many to be absurd. Both of these
reactions to linguistic nativism are, to my mind, nutty. Here’s why.
That we are biologically built for language is a truism.
After all, name another physical object or biological being that does what we
do linguistically? There are none, or at
least none that we know of. In short,
the claim that we are biologically “language ready” is about as exciting as
noting that the sun rises in the East, unless, of course, you don’t believe
that our mental capacities are biologically grounded. And nobody believes that! Hence, that we are “language ready,”
biologically built for language, is a truism.
How about the second claim; that what makes us language
ready relies on language specific powers
and capacities rather than more general cognitive wherewithal? This is not a truism if true. But nor is it
absurd. It is what we call in the trade “an empirical issue.” If true, then it
argues against simplistic tabula rasa
theories of mind. This makes it a favorite target of the Empiricistically
inclined. However, one of the glories of GG has been to show how this question
can be made empirical rather than philosophical. GG has shown how to argue for
and against the language specificity of our linguistic powers. Should
linguistic competence be reducible to other more general non-linguistic
competences, that would be a fascinating discovery. IMO, this prospect is
currently very unlikely (though being a card carrying minimalist I hope (and I know that hoping is one
thing and showing another) that many linguistic specific FL/UG details can be
off-loaded to more general cognitive operations of other third factors).[9]
However, I can see how this might be accomplished in principle. This said, I
also know what needs to be done to show this; people who think that linguistic
competence does not involve a language specific FL need to show how to explain the
mass of data that GGers have discovered and analyzed over the last 60 years
without invoking language specific concepts and mechanisms. Nothing short of
this will serve. The problem with VE’s work (and that of many others who have
preached the same sermon about the demise of GG) is that it completely fails to engage with this
work. That’s why it’s intellectual junk, albeit sociologically very revealing.
[1]
I will even refrain from commenting on VE’s most impressive riposte, namely his
threat to sue critics (see here). This
indiscrete polemical feint was quietly withdrawn and expunged from the record
by VE, sans apology. Given the
alternatives, I prefer VE’s current less bellicose strategy of simply avoiding
discussion of the main issues.
[2]
At least these are the major problems. There are a host of lesser ones that the
posts linked to above also review.
[3]
VE’s latest post linked to above seems to have trouble with many other
conceptual distinctions. For example, VE has a problem distinguishing a program
from a theory. Chomsky has always been careful to distinguish the two notions.
For example, GB theory was part of the P&P program. At this moment, there
are many minimalist theories animated
by the leading ideas of the Minimalist Program.
Thus, Chomsky’s distinction between program and theory is in no way an
empirical retreat in the face of empirical findings, as VE suggests. It’s just the normal way of conducting
scientific business.
[5]
Sadly, it does boost its truthiness, which is precisely what the
agnotologically inclined count on. Repetition can serve to provide the appearance of controversiality (i.e. the
idea that there are two sides to a question) even when one of the sides is
based on equivocation, as in this case where GUs are confused for CUs.
[6]
It is worth adding that VE’s work does not discuss the now substantial
literature that analyzes GUs from a GG perspective. It appears that some GUs
are well grounded empirically. Further, there are some interesting attempts to
explain their properties using standard arguments based on UG (and other)
principles. It is unclear why EV’s work
does not discuss these given their obvious relevance to his basic claims.
[7]
I leave as an exercise for the reader the application of the GU/CU equivocation
as applied to Everett’s Piraha discussion. This is the poster child against CUs
that is endlessly trotted out. It too suffers from the confusion endemic to
VE’s oeuvre. See here
and here
for more detailed discussion.
[8]
I mention this because VE seems to point to the fact that six “world leading
experts” blessed the book for CUP before publication. They may have blessed it,
but it seems that they didn’t read it, at least not carefully.
[9]
Let me mention one more confusion that VE seems to have fallen into. Chomsky
has conjectured that most of what earlier theories postulated as linguistic
specific features of UG could and should be reinterpreted in less
linguistically parochial terms. He as further conjectured that the only
linguistically specific operation (and even this may not be proprietary to FL
he has at times surmised) is Merge. It
is important to note that this is a conjecture,
and that’s what makes the Minimalist Program a program. Whether Chomsky is right, is currently being aggressively
investigated. For what it is worth, IMO, we are still far from grounding this
conjecture empirically, though we have made some very interesting analytic
connections in trying to realize it.
Importantly, for Chomsky to be right requires deriving earlier GG
results using these less linguistically specific notions. This has not yet been
done. In other words, no current minimalist theory has yet realized the
ambitions of the program. Is this a problem? Not obviously. Why not? Because
this is just how science works. Let me explain.
Programs are not true or
false but fecund or sterile. They are judged fecund to the degree that they
engender theories that can be empirically evaluated as true and false. In other
words, good science attempts to realize fecund programs in various explanatory empirically
grounded theories. Theories are constantly proposed, elaborated, and rejiggered
in face of puzzles. This is normal science. VE does not seem to appreciate this
(could it be because he is not actually a practitioner?).
Nor does he seem to understand
what Kuhn intended by an anomaly. Anomalies are problems that current theory cannot accommodate given its current
conceptual apparatus (e.g. black body radiation given classical mechanics) not
things that theory appropriately revamped doesn’t happen to cover. The former
require deep conceptual revisions (hence the revolution) the former require
revamping the details of the current conceptions (hence their being normal
science). At any rate, this confusion between program and theory leads VE to say,
not surprisingly, several odd things and to misrepresent the state of play in
current GG.
