Chomsky has long noted the tension between description and
explanation. One methodological aim of the early Minimalist Program (MP) was to
focus attention on this tension so as to nudge theories in a more explanatory
direction.[1]
The most important hygienic observation of early MP was that many proffered
analyses within GB lacked explanatory power for they were as complex as the
data they intended to “explain.” Early MP aimed to sharpen our appreciation of
the difference between (re)description and explanation and to encourage us to
question the utility of proposals that serve mainly to extend the descriptive
range of our technical apparatus.
How well has this early MP goal been realized? IMO, not
particularly well. I have had an opportunity of late to read more widely in the
literature than I generally do and from this brief foray into the outside world
it looks to me that the overriding imperative of the bulk of current syntax
research is descriptive. Indeed, the explanatory urge, weak as it has been in
the past, appears to me now largely non-existent. Here’s what I mean.
The papers I’ve read have roughly the following kinds of
structure:
1. Phenomenon
X has been analyzed in two different ways; W1 and W2. In this paper I provide
evidence that both W1 and W2 are required.
2. Principle
P forbids structures like S. This paper argues that phenomenon X shows that P
must be weakened to P’ and/or that an additional principle P’’ is required to
handle the concomitant over-generation.
3. Principle
P prohibits S. Language L exhibits S. To reconcile P with S in L we augment the
features in L with F, which allows L to evade P wrt S.
In each instance, the imperative to cover the relevant data
points has been paramount. The explanatory costs of doing so are largely
unacknowledged. Let me put this a different way. All linguists agree that ceteris paribus simpler theories are
preferable to more complex ones (i.e. Ockham shaves us all!). The question is: What
makes things not equal? Here is where
the trade-off between explanation and description plays out.
MP considerations urge us to live with a few recalcitrant
data points rather than weaken our explanatory standards.[2] The descriptive impulse urges us to weaken
our theory to “capture” the strays. There is no right or wrong move in these
circumstances. Which way to jump is a matter of judgment. The calculus requires
balancing our explanatory and descriptive urges. My reading of the literature
is that right now, the latter almost completely dominate. In other words, much
(most?) current research is always ready to sacrifice explanation in service of
data coverage. Why?
I can think of several reasons for this.
First, I think that the Chomsky program for linguistics has
never been widely endorsed by the linguistic community. To be more precise, whereas
Chomskian technology has generally
garnered an enthusiastic following, the larger cognitive/bio-linguistic program that this technology was in
service of, has been warily embraced, if at all. How many times have you seen
someone question a technical innovation because it would serve to make a
solution to Plato’s or Darwin’s problem more difficult? How many papers have
you read lately that aim to reduce
rather than expand the number of operative principles in FL/UG? More pointedly,
how often do we insist that students be able to construct Poverty of Stimulus (POS)
arguments? Indeed, if my experience is anything to go by, the ability to
construct a POS is not considered a necessary part of a linguist’s education. Not
surprisingly, asking whether a given phenomenon or proposal raises
“learnability” issues at all is generally not part of evaluative calculus. The main concerns revolve around how to
deploy/reconfigure the given technology to “capture the facts.”[3]
Second, most linguists take their object of study to be
language not the faculty of language. Sophisticates take the goal of
linguistics to be the discovery of grammatical patterns. This contrasts with
the view that the goal of linguistics is to uncover the basic architecture of
FL. I have previously dubbed the first group languists and the second linguists.
There is no question that languists and linguists can happily co-exist and that
the work of each can be beneficial to the other.[4]
However, it is important to appreciate that the two groups (the first being
very much bigger than the second) are engaged in different enterprises. The
grandfather of languistics is Greenberg, not Chomsky. The goal of languistics
is essentially descriptive, the prize going to the most thorough descriptions
of the most languages. Its slogan might be no
language left behind.
Linguists are far more opportunistic. The description of
different languages is not a goal in itself. It is valuable precisely to the
degree that it sheds light on novel mechanisms and organizing principles of FL.
The languistic impulse is that working on a new
or understudied language is ipso
facto valuable. Not so the linguistic one. Linguists note that biology has come
a long way studying essentially three organisms: mice, e-coli and fruit flies.
There is nothing wrong in studying other organisms, but there is nothing
particularly right about it either. Why? Because the aim is to uncover the
underlying biological mechanisms, and
if these do not radically differ across organisms then myopically focusing on
three is a fine way to proceed. Why assume that the study of FL will be any
different? Don’t get me wrong here: studying other organisms/languages might be useful. What is rejected is the
presupposition that this is
inherently worthwhile.
Together, the above two impulses (actually two faces of the
same one) reflect a deeper belief that the Chomsky program is more philosophy
than science. This reflects a more general view that theoretical speculation is
largely flocculent, whereas description is hard and grounded. You must know
what I am about to say next: this reflects the age-old difference between
empiricist and rationalist approaches to naturalistic explanation. Empiricism
has always suspected theoretical speculation, conceiving of theory in largely
instrumental terms. For a rationalist what’s real are the underlying mechanisms, the data being complex
manifestations of the interacting more primitive operations. For the
empiricist, the data are real, the
theoretical constructs being bleached averages of the data, with their main
virtue being concision. Chomsky’s program really is Rationalist (both in its
psychology and its scientific
methodology). The languistic impulse is empiricist. Given that Empiricism is
the default “scientific” position (Lila Gleitman once remarked that it is
likely innate), it is not surprising that explanation almost always gives way
to description, for the former has not independent existence from the latter.
So what to do? I don’t know. What I suspect, however, is
that the rise of languistics is not good for the future of the field. To the
degree that it dominates the discipline it cuts Linguistics off from the more
vibrant parts of the wider intellectual scene, especially cognitive and
neuro-science. Philology is not a 21st century growth industry. Linguistics
won’t be either if it fails to make room for the explanatory impulse.
[1]
MP had both a methodological and a substantive set of ambitions. A good part of
the original 93 paper was concerned with the former in the context of GB style
theories.
[2]
Living with them does not entail ignoring or forgetting about them. Most
theories, even very good ones, have a stable of problem cases. Collecting and
cataloguing them is worthwhile even if theory is insulated from them.
[3]
This is evident in the review process as well. One of the virtues of NELs and
WCCFL papers is that they are short and their main ideas easy to discern. By
the time a paper is expanded for publication in a “real” journal it has bloated
so much that often the main point is obscured. Why the bloat? In part this is a
response to the adept reviewer’s empirical observations and scrambling by the
author to cover the unruly data point. This is often done by adding some ad hoc
excrescence that it takes pages and pages to defend and elaborate. Wouldn’t the
world be a better place if the author simply noted the problem and went on
leaving the general theory/proposal untouched? I think it would. But this would
require judging the interest of the general proposal, i.e. the theory would
have to be evaluated independently of whether it covered every last data point.
[4]
IMO, one of the reasons for GG’s success was that it allowed the two to live
harmoniously without getting into disputes. MP sharpens the differences between
languists and linguists and this may in part explain its more luke warm
embrace.
