There are many paths into linguistics. Some meander in from various
languages, some from math, CS, psych, and bio. I came from philosophy. In fact,
when I was a young lad, linguistics was pregnant almost to bursting with
philosophical implications and lessons. It was the modern venue for the great
debate between Empiricism and Rationalism, a major challenge for
neuro-reductionism (of the connectionist variety), and the poster child for the
computational theory of mind. In other words, discoveries in linguistics seemed
to have implications for the great questions of the ages and this was (and
still is, IMO) what made (and makes) it so exciting.
If your tastes run in the same direction that mine do, here
is a recent little paper by Chomsky that might interest you. It touches on a
host of themes, including: “the creative aspect of language use,” the mind-body
problem, the limits of scientific inquiry, scientific intelligibility, the
reduction of chemistry to physics as a model for the reduction of cognition to
neuro-science, among others. These are themes that Chomsky has developed over
his linguistic/philosophical career, and he brings them together here in a very
accessible form. Let me say a word or two about some of the issues he touches
on.
He starts the paper with a discussion of how the creative
aspect of language use (i.e. the fact that the “ordinary use of language is
typically innovative without bounds, appropriate to circumstances but not
caused by them –a crucial distinction- and can engender thoughts in others that
they recognize they could have expressed themselves” (1)) motivated Descartes’
dualistic distinction between mind and body.[1]
Chomsky’s makes two interesting points. First, that Descartes’ mind/body
dualism was a reasonable scientific
theory given the prevalent (and by prevalent I mean the entire whose who of 17th
century scientific revolution) contact mechanical doctrine of physical
interaction (viz. the position, that implied, for example, that there could be
no action at a distance). And second,
that Newton’s discovery of gravitational action at a distance effectively
exploded Descartes’ dualistic position not by exorcising the mental ghost in
the bodily machine, but by dispensing with the machine. Newton’s work led to
the collapse of contact mechanics as the overarching criterion of scientific
legitimacy and so exploded the notion of body on which Descartes’ position
relied. No body, no well posed mind/body problem.
Chomsky observes that this consequence of Newton’s very
successful physical theory was widely appreciated both in his time and later.
Indeed, it was understood by Locke, Hume, Newton, Lange, Koyre (indeed everyone
really until the modern period) that Newton’s work rendered materialism (the
body part of the dualism) an insignificant (actually contentless) doctrine for
after Newton there was no principled way of distinguishing the material from the
non-material forces save sociologically (viz. materialism being whatever
physicists decided to accept as part of physics).
Chomsky further notes some of the consequences that this had
for the relation between minds and brains. It was quickly assumed that
mentation was what brains secrete, though how
this was possible (i.e. how mental activity could supervene on brain activity)
was somewhat mysterious, as remains more or less true to this day (see
especially Chomsky’s quote of Vernon Mountcastle on p. 5).[2]
All of this has consequences for the reduction of cognition
to neuro-biology. Chomsky touches on this, and helpfully illuminates the issues
at stake by reviewing the history of the “reduction” of chemistry to physics.
Yes, those are scare quotes. For as Chomsky notes reduction was quite tortuous,
with the principles of chemistry more or less preserved in a radically
reconfigured physics. Chomsky points to relevant morals for the current concerns
of how to reduce minds to brains and points to something that IMO is very
important: that the best way to proceed is not to worry too much about evident
“explanatory gaps” (6). In fact, the best thing to do is emulate the earlier
history of chemistry and physics which means “developing a body of doctrine”
(Joseph Blacks’ phrase) in each discipline before worrying too much about how
to unify them. Right now, as Chomsky
notes, neither cognition (and even linguistics!) nor neuro-science are as
advanced as chemistry and physics were in the 19th century so there
is likely still to be a lot of doctrine worth developing in both domains independently
of any issues of unification or reduction. And, just as happened in the
chemistry/physics unification, there is no reason to think that the right way
to proceed will be via reduction of cognition to neuro-science. In fact, given
how little we know about the brain it is just as likely that any unification
awaits deeper understanding of the latter (a point that Gallistel has also
frequently made).[3]
The last part of the paper addresses the common view that
there is nothing opaque to scientific understanding. The opposite is called
“mysterianism.” Chomsky dismantles this view, and linguists should read it for
it touches on a concern that non-professionals often have with Generative
Grammar (GG). What is it?
GGers argue that humans come with a lot of specific built in
structure that allows humans to learn Natural Languages (NL). Many object to
this kind of nativism for they see it as a reactionary doctrine that treats
human characteristics as immutable, thereby limiting human potential. This is
incorrect, but it is a pervasive reaction. Chomsky’s discussion provides a
useful contrary picture. As he notes, our prized powers are the flip sides of our
necessary limits. No limits, no scope. If you prize human creativity and
originality, then you must also prize the structures that support these. And
any structures will impose limits, for that’s what structure does.
There is one last overarching theme of this little paper:
intellectual modesty. It seems that the great Enlightenment figures were less
prone to scientism than modern scientists are. They seemed to appreciate not
only what they knew but what they didn’t know and didn’t disparage the latter
because it resisted our efforts at explanation. Chomsky proposes some modesty
regarding these matters. As he notes: “The quest for better explanations may
well be infinite, but infinite is of course not the same as limitless. English
is limitless infinite (thx MJ), but doesn’t include Greek” (9). Similarly, there is no reason to
doubt that some questions might forever be beyond human understanding (at least
of the scientific kind), as Hume and Locke and Descartes (and most other
Enlightenment luminaries) thought. There is no reason to think that among the
animals only humans have no cognitive limits. Indeed, the contrary view comes
close to being a modern form of Dualism.
In sum, there is a lot packed into this paper’s 10 pages.
Enjoy. I did.
[1]
This creative aspect of language use is different from the recursive hierarchy
that natural languages display though it is related to it (Note the “innovative
without bounds” above). This creative aspect is a feature of action, not a
property of knowledge, which is why Descartes saw this sort of activity as
indicative of something like free will and Hume saw it as a manifestation of
imagination. Neither philosopher believed that these powers would ever be fully
comprehensible to us.
[2]
There is still a hot debate about this mysterious connection that flies under
the banner of qualia, e.g. why does firing of fiber X result in my perception
of red?
