As promised in my previous post, here's Omer's reply to my musings on derivations and representations.
In a recent post on this blog, Thomas Graf addresses the derivationalism vs. representationalism debate---sparked (Thomas' post, that is) by my remarks in the comments section of this post.
Thomas notes, among other things, that literally any derivational formalism can be recast representationally. For example, one could take the set of licit derivational operations in the former model, and turn them into representational well-formedness conditions on adjacent pairs of syntactic trees in an ordered sequence. (Each tree in this ordered sequence corresponds, informally, to an intermediate derivational step in the former model.) As best I can tell, this translatability of any derivational formalism into representational terms is not even debatable; I certainly wouldn't argue this point.
Showing posts with label Derivations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Derivations. Show all posts
Sunday, August 24, 2014
The Cake is a Lie
In the comments section to Norbert's final remarks on Chomsky's lecture series, Omer Preminger laments the resurrection of representational devices in Minimalism, which started with Chomsky (2004) "Beyond Explanatory Adequacy". I originally took Omer to argue against representational approaches on two levels:
will summarize in a guest post within the next few days summarizes in this follow-up post. Still, now that we've got those two claims laid out in front of us, let's assess their soundness.
I've got no qualms with the second claim. The motivation and empirical use of phases has frequently been criticized in the literature, and phases don't fare any better from a computational perspective. The memory reduction argument for phases is hogwash, phases have no discernible effect on generative capacity (neither weak nor strong), and they do not simplify the learning problem. Norbert captures the state of affairs ever so succinctly: Phases don't walk the walk [...] the rhetoric is often ahead of the results.
The first claim, on the other hand, I can't get behind at all. For one thing, it's a typical case of the cake fallacy: Every cake I've made in my life has been horrible, thus all cakes are horrible (and I'm more of a muffins guy anyways). Even if linguists haven't come up with any good representational models so far --- which I think many syntacticians would emphatically disagree with --- that doesn't mean the approach as such is intrinsically inferior to derivational ones. Now I can already see the flurry of posts about how theory construction is also a probabilistic process where previous failures of specific types of analysis make them less preferable, that the existence of a working representational account is moot if we can't find it, yada yada yada. Step back from your keyboards everyone, I'm actually not interested in arguing this point. My real worry is much more basic. The first claim implies, as is commonly done in linguistics, that there is a meaningful difference between representational and derivational accounts. Well, it turns out that this specific cake is a lie.
- They are fundamentally flawed regarding both competence (bad empirical coverage) and performance (no plausible parsing model).
- Phase-theory is ill-motivated and doesn't get the job done.
I've got no qualms with the second claim. The motivation and empirical use of phases has frequently been criticized in the literature, and phases don't fare any better from a computational perspective. The memory reduction argument for phases is hogwash, phases have no discernible effect on generative capacity (neither weak nor strong), and they do not simplify the learning problem. Norbert captures the state of affairs ever so succinctly: Phases don't walk the walk [...] the rhetoric is often ahead of the results.
The first claim, on the other hand, I can't get behind at all. For one thing, it's a typical case of the cake fallacy: Every cake I've made in my life has been horrible, thus all cakes are horrible (and I'm more of a muffins guy anyways). Even if linguists haven't come up with any good representational models so far --- which I think many syntacticians would emphatically disagree with --- that doesn't mean the approach as such is intrinsically inferior to derivational ones. Now I can already see the flurry of posts about how theory construction is also a probabilistic process where previous failures of specific types of analysis make them less preferable, that the existence of a working representational account is moot if we can't find it, yada yada yada. Step back from your keyboards everyone, I'm actually not interested in arguing this point. My real worry is much more basic. The first claim implies, as is commonly done in linguistics, that there is a meaningful difference between representational and derivational accounts. Well, it turns out that this specific cake is a lie.
Friday, February 14, 2014
Derivation Trees and Phrase Structure
Another snow day, another blog post. Last week we took a gander at derivation trees and noticed that they satisfy a number of properties that should appeal to Minimalists. Loudmouth that I am I took things a step further and proclaimed that there is no good reason to keep using phrase structure trees now that we have this shiny new toy that does everything phrase structure trees do, just better. Considering the central role of phrase structure trees, that's a pretty bold claim... or is it?
Monday, February 3, 2014
Derivation Trees: Syntacticians' Best Friend?
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