This is a long post.
I guess I got carried away. In my defense, I think that the topic keeps
coming up obliquely and so it’s time to take it head on. The issue is the role
of formalization in grammatical research. Let me be up front with the
conclusion: there’s nothing wrong with it, it can be valuable if done the right
way, it has been valuable in some cases where it has been done the right way, but
there seems to be an attitude floating in the atmosphere that there is
something inherently indispensible about it, and that anything that is not
formalized is ipso facto contentless
and/or incapable of empirical examination.
This, IMO, is balderdash (a word I’ve always wanted to use). This is not only false within linguistics, it
is false for other sciences as well (I mention a few examples below). Moreover, the golden glow of formalization
often comes wrapped in its won dark cloud. In particular, if done without a
sensitivity to the theories/concepts of interest, it risks being imposing
looking junk. This is actually more deleterious
than simple junk for formalizations can suggest depth and can invite a demand
for respect that simple junk does not. This point will take me some time to
elaborate and that’s why the post is way too long. Here goes.
There is an interesting chain of conversation in the thread
to this
post. In the original, I outlined “a cute example” from Chomsky, which
illustrated the main point about structure dependence but sans the string
altering features that T to C movement (TCM) in Yes/No questions (Y/N) can induce.
To briefly review, the example in (1) requires that instinctively modify the main verb swim rather than the verb inside the relative clause fly; this despite (i) the fact that
eagles do instinctively fly but don’t instinctively swim (at least I don’t
think they do) and (ii) fly is
linearly closer to instinctively than
swim is.
(1) Instinctively,
eagles that fly swim
The analogy to T to C movement (TCM) in Y/Ns lies in both adverbial
modification and TCM being insensitive
to string linear properties. I thought the example provided a nice simple
illustration of how one can get sidetracked by irrelevant surface differences
(e.g. in *Is the boy who sleeping is
dreaming, the pair who sleeping
is an illicit bigram) from missing the main point, viz. that examples like this
are a dime a dozen and that this surface blemish cannot generally be expected
to help matters much (e.g. Can boys that
sleep dream means ‘is it the case that boys that sleep can dream’ and not ‘is
it the case that boys that can sleep dream’).
At any rate, I thought that the adverbial modification facts were useful
in making this point, but I was wrong.
And I was wrong because I failed to consider how the adverbial case
would be generated and how its generation compared to that of Y/Ns. I plan to
try and rectify this mistake here before getting on to a discussion of how and
whether formalization can clarify matters, a point raised in the notes by Alex
Clark and Benjamin Boerschinger, though in somewhat different ways. But first
let’s consider the syntax of the matter.
The standard analysis of Y/Ns is that T moves to C to
discharge some demand of C. More specifically, in some Gs (note TCM is not a feature of UG!), +WH C needs a finite
T for “support.” GB analyzes this operation as a species of head movement from
the genus ‘move alpha’. Minimalists (at
least some) have treated this as an instance of I-merge. Let’s assume something
like this is correct. The UGish question is why in sentences like (2) can must be interpreted as moving from
the matrix T and not the embedded relative clause T?
What makes (2) interesting is precisely the fact that in
cases like this there are two potential candidates available for satisfying the
needs of C+WH but that only one of them can serve, the other being
strictly prohibited from moving. The relevant question is what principle selects
the right T for movement? One answer is that the relevant T is the one
“closest” to C and that proximity is measured hierarchically, not
linearly. Indeed, such examples show
that were locality measured string
linearly then the opposite facts should obtain. Thus, these kinds of data
indicate that in such cases we had
better prohibit string linear measures of proximity as they never seem to be empirically condign for
Y/Ns.
So far, I believe, there is no controversy. The battle
begins in trying to locate the source of the prohibition against string linear
restrictions like the one proposed. For people like me, we take these kinds of
cases to indicate that the prohibition has its roots in UG. Thus, a particular
G eschews strong linear notions of proximity because UG eschews such notions
and thus they cannot be components of particular Gs. Others argue that the
prohibitions are G specific and thus that structure independent processes of syntax are possible but for the
appropriate input. In other words, were our young LADs and LASs (language
acquisition device/system) exposed to the relevant input they would acquire rules that moved the
linearly most proximate T to C rather than the hierarchically most prominent
one. Thus, the disagreement, like all disagreements about scientific
principles, is one about counterfactual situations. So, how does one argue about a
counterfactual?
My side scours the Gs of the world and argues that linear
sensitive rules are never found in their syntax and that this argues that structure
dependence is part of UG. Or, we argue that the relevant data to eliminate the
strong linear condition is unavailable in the PLD available to LADs and LASs
and so the absence of strong linear conditions in GEnglish, for
example, cannot be traced to the inductive proclivities of LADs and LASs. The
other side argues (or has to argue) that this is just a coincidence for there
is nothing inherent to Gs that prohibits such processes and that in cases where
particular Gs eschew string linear conditions it’s because the data surveyed in
the acquisition process sufficed to eliminate it, not because such conditions
could not have been incorporated into particular Gs to regulate how their rules
apply.
Note that the arguments are related but independent. Should
the absence of any string linear
prohibitions in any Gs prove correct
(and I believe that it is very strongly supported) it should cast doubt on any
kind of “coincidence” theory (btw, this is where the adverbial cases in (1) are
relevant). So too should evidence that the PLD is too weak to provide an
inductive basis for eliminating the strong linear option (which I also believe
has been demonstrated, at least to my satisfaction).[2]
This said, it is important to note that this is a very weak
conclusion. It simply indicates that
something inherent to UG eliminates string linear conditions as options, it
does not specify what the structure relevant feature of UG is.[3]
And here is where collapsing (1) and (2) can mislead. Let me explain.
The example in (1) would typically be treated as a case of
adverb fronting (AF), along the lines of (3).[4]
(3) Adverb1
[…t1…]
AF contrasts with TCM in several respects. First, it is not
obligatory. Thus declaratives without AF are perfectly acceptable, in contrast
with Y/Ns without TCM.[5]
Second, whereas every finite clause must contain a T, not every finite
declarative need contain an adverb.
The first difference can be finessed in a simple (quite uninteresting)
way. We can postulate that whenever AF has applied some head F has attracted
it. Thus, AF in (1) is not really optional. What’s optional is the F feature
that attracts the adverb. Once there, it functions like its needy C+WH
counterpart.
The second difference, I believe, drives a wedge between the
two cases. Here’s how: given that a
relative clause and a matrix clause will each contain (finite) T0s
and hence both be potential C+WH rescuers, there is no reason to
think that they will each contain adverbs. Why’s this relevant? Because whereas
for TCM we can argue that we need a principle to select the relevant T that moves, there is no obvious choice of
mover required for AF. So whereas we can
argue that the right principle for TCM in (4a) is something like Shortest
Attract/Move (SA/M) this would not suffice for (4b) where there is but one
adverb available for fronting.[6]
Thus, if SA/M is the right principle
regulating TCM it does not suffice to regulate AF cases (if, I assume here,
they are species of I-merge).
(4) a.
[C+WH [RC …T…]…T…]
b.
[F+ADV [RC …ADV…]…]
What else is required? Well, the obvious answer is something
like the CNPC and/or the Subject Condition (SC). Both would suffice to block AF
in (4b). Moreover, both have long been considered properties of UG and both are
clearly structure sensitive prohibitions (they are decidedly not string linear).[7]
However, island conditions and minimality restrictions are clearly different
locality conditions even if both are structure dependent.[8]
Now this has been a long-winded and overly didactic review
of a much over-discussed example. Why do I bring this up again?! Because of
some comments by Alex Clark suggesting that the AF facts could be derived in
formalized minimalist grammars and that therefore this nullifies any
explanation of the kind provided above, viz. that UG explains the data in (1)
and (2) by noting that the relevant structures are underivable (my emphasis in
what follows):
So here is a more
controversial technical claim:
let English+ be English
with additionally the single incorrect pairing (s,w2). English+ can be
generated by an MCFG; ergo it can be generated by an MG. English++ is English
but additionally with the fronted adverbs out of subject relatives.; again
generable by an MG. (MG means Stabler's
Minimalist grammars with shortest move constraint). So I think these claims
are correct, and if not could someone technical chime in and correct me.
So
Norbert is right that the grammars will look strange. Very strange indeed if
you actually convert them from an MCFG. But they are allowed by this class of
grammars, which in a sense defines the notion of licit grammatical dependencies
in the theory. So Norbert wants to say,
oh well if my theory makes the wrong predictions then it has been formalized
incorrectly, and when it is formalized correctly it will make the right
predictions, Period. But while this is certainly a ballsy argument, it's
not really playing the game.
Alex is right, Stabler’s MG with SA/M can derive the
relevant AF examples as the derivation implicit in (4b) does not violate SA/M.
That’s why an MG including this (let’s call it ‘SMG’) cannot prevent the
derivation. However, as Stabler (here)
notes there are other MGs that code for
other kinds of locality restrictions. In fact, there are whole families of
such, some encoding relativized minimality (RMG) and some embodying phases (PMG
and PCMG). I assume, though Stabler does not explicitly discuss this, that it
is also possible to combine different locality restrictions together in an MG
(i.e. RPMG that combines both relativized minimality and phases). So what we
have are formalizations of various MG grammars (SMG, RMG, PMG, PCMG, and RPMG)
all with slightly different locality properties that generate slightly
different licit structural configurations. Stabler shows that despite these
differences, these restricted versions of MG all share some common
computational properties such as efficient recognition and parsability. However, they are, as Stabler notes, also different
in that they allow for different kinds of licit configurations, PMG/PCMGs
blocking dependencies that violate the PIC and RMGs blocking those that violate
relativized minimality (see his section 4). In sum, there are varieties of MGs that have been
formalized by Stabler and Co. and these encode different kinds of conditions that have been empirically motivated in the minimalist literature.[9]
There is no problem formalizing these different MGs nor in recognizing that
despite being different in what structures they license they can still share
some common general properties.
Three observations: First, I leave it as an exercise for the
reader to code island restrictions (like the CNPC) in phase based terms. This
is not hard to do given that phases and the original subjacency theory (i.e.
employing bounding nodes) are virtually isomorphic terms (hint: D is a phase
without an accessible phase edge).[10]
Second, the Stabler paper offers one very good reason for
formalizing grammars. The paper shows that different theories (i.e. those that
characterize UG differently) can nonetheless share many features in
common. Though empirically relevant, the
different locality conditions do not differ in some of their more general
computational features. Good. What we see is that not all empirically different
characterizations of FL/UG need have entirely different computational
properties.[11]
Third, Stabler recognizes that the way to explore MG and UG
computationally is to START with the empirically motivated
features research has discovered and then develop formalizations that encode
them. More pointedly, this seems to contrast with Alex’s favored method of
choosing some arbitrary formalism (simple MG) and then insisting that anyone
who thinks that this is the wrong formalism (e.g. moi) for the problem at hand
is (though “ballsy,” hmm, really! OK), “not really playing the game.” Au contraire: to be interesting the formal
game requires formalizing the right things.
If research has found that FL/UG contains islands and minimality, then
to be interesting your formalization had better code both these restrictions.
If it doesn’t it’s just the wrong
formalization and is not, and should not, be part of any game anyone
focused on FL/UG plays. There may be some other game (as David Adger suggests
in his comments on the post) but it is arguably of no obvious relevance to any
research that syntacticians like moi are engaged in and of dubious relevance to
the investigation of FL/UG or the acquisition of grammar. Boy, that felt good
to say![12]
Now, it is possible that some grammars encode inconsistent
principles and that formalization could demonstrate this (think Russell’s
Paradox and Frege’s naïve set theory). However, this is not at issue here. What
is at issue is how one conceives of the proper role of formalization in this
sort of inquiry. Frankly, I am a big fan. I think that there has been some very
insightful work of the formalizing sort.[13]
However, there has also been a lot of bullying. And there has been a lot of
misguided rhetoric. Formalization is useful, but hardly indispensible.
Remember, Euclidean geometry did just fine for thousands of years before
finally formalized by Hilbert, so too the Calculus before Cauchy/Weierstrass.
Not to mention standard work in biology and physics, which though (sometimes)
mathematical is hardly formalized (not at all the same thing; formal does not
equate with formalized). What we need are clear models that make clear
predictions and that can be explored. Formalization can help in this process,
and to the degree that it does, it should be encouraged. But PULEEEZE, it is
not a panacea and it is not even a pre-requisite for good work. And, in general it should be understood to be
the handmaiden of theory, not its taskmaster. To repeat, formalizations that
formalize the wrong things or leave out the right things is of questionable
value. Jim Higginbotham has expressed this well in his discussion of whether
English is a context free language (here).[14]
As he put it:
…once our attention turns to core
grammar as the primary object of linguistic study, questions such as the one
that I have tried to answer here are of secondary importance (232).
What matters are the properties of FL/UG. Formalizations
that encompass these are interesting and can be useful tools for investigating
further properties of FL/UG. But, and this is the important part (maybe this is
what makes my attitude “ballsy”) they must earn their keep and if they fail to
code the relevant features of “core grammar” or FL/UG then, no matter how
careful and precise their claims I don’t see what they bring to the game. Quite often what we find is all hat, no
cattle.
[1]
The traces are here to mark the possible base positions of can. (*…) means ‘unacceptable if included’ while *(…) means
unacceptable if left out.
[2]
There are also actual language acquisition studies like Crain and Nakayama that
are relevant to evaluating the UG claim.
[3]
Indeed, it need not be a feature of UG at all, at least in principle. Imagine an argument to the effect that
learning in general, i.e. whatever the cognitive domain, ignores string linear
information. Were that so, it would suffice to explain why it is so ignored in
the acquisition of Gs. However, this
view strikes me as quite exotic and, I believe, would cause not small degree of
problems in the acquisition of phonology, for example, where string linear
relations is where all the action is.
[4]
I assume that this is how to treat AF. If, however, adverbs could be base
generated sentence initially and their interpretation were subject to a rule
like “modify the nearest V” then AF phenomena would be entirely analogous to
CTMs. The main reason I doubt that this is the right analysis comes from data
like that in note 7, where it appears that adverbs can move quite a distance
from the verbs they modify. This is certainly true of WH adverbs like when and how but I also find the cases like (i) in note 7 acceptable with
long distance readings.
[5]
TCM also seems obligatory in WH questions, thought there is some debate right
now about whether TCMs applies in questions like who left. For Y/Ns, however, it is always required in matrix
clauses. Here is a shameless plug for a discussion of these matters in a recent
paper joint paper with Vicki Carstens and Dan Seely (here).
[6]
I hope it goes without saying that I am simplifying matters here. The relevant
F is not +ADV for example, but something closer to +focus, but none of this is
relevant here as far as I can see.
[7]
There is one further important difference between TCM and AF. The latter is not
strictly local. Thus, in (i) tomorrow
can modify either the matrix or the embedded clauses. Nonetheless, it cannot
modify the relative clause in (ii):
(i)
Tomorrow, NBR is reporting that Bill will be in
Moscow
(ii)
Tomorrow, the news anchor that is reporting from
DC will be in Moscow
[8]
I am setting aside the question whether there is a way of unifying the two. It
is to be hoped that there is, but I don’t know of any currently workable
suggestions. Such a unification would not alter anything said below, though it
would make for a richer and nicer theory of FL/UG.
[9]
In other papers Stabler considers MGs that allow for sidewards movement and
those that don’t. It is nice to see that to date the theoretical innovations
proposed have been formalizable in pretty straightforward ways, or so it
appears.
[10]
Stabler observes the obvious parallelism with bounding node versions of
Subjacency. The isomorphism between the older GB theory and modern Phase Theory
means that Phase Theory does not advance our understanding of islands in any
minimalistically interesting way. However, for current purposes the fact that
Phases and the PIC can code the CNPC and SC suffices. We all welcome the day
when we have a deeper understanding of the locality restrictions underlying
islands.
[11]
IMO, this is the best reason to formalize: to see if two things that look very
different may nonetheless be similar (or identical) in with respect to other properties of interest. It is possible to be careful and clear
without being formalized (indeed, the latter often obscues as much as it
enlightens). However, formalizing often allows one to take a bird’s eye view of
theoretical matters that matter, and when used thus they it can be extremely
enlightening.
[12]
Let me insist: this is not to argue that formalization does not have a place in
such investigations. Rather, it is to argue that the fact that some
formalization fails to make the relevant cut is generally a problem about the
formalization not the adequacy of the empirical cut. See below.
[13]
I am a big fan of Bob Berwicks’s work, as well as Stabler and Co, Tim Hunter’s
(with Chris and alone), stuff on Phonology by Heinz and Idsardi to name a few.
What makes these all interesting to me is their being anchored firmly in the
syntactic theory literature.
[14]
Thx to Bob Berwick for the reference.
